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In reliability analysis one is interested in studying the reliability of a technological
system being small or large. As examples of small systems we have washing machines
and cars, whereas tankers, oilrigs and nuclear power plants are examples of large
systems, see marine insurance, nuclear risks. By the reliability of a system we
will mean the probability that it functions as intended. It might be tacitly assumed
that we consider the system only for a specified period of time (for instance one year)
and under specified conditions (for instance disregarding war actions and sabotage).
Furthermore, one has to make clear what is meant by functioning. For oilrigs and
nuclear power plants it might be to avoid serious accidents, see accident insurance,
such as a blow-out or a core-melt.
It should be acknowledged that the relevance of reliability theory to insurance
was pointed out by Straub [27] at the start of the seventies. In his paper he applies
results and techniques from reliability theory to establish bounds for unknown loss
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probabilities. A recent paper by Mallor & Omey [14] is in a way in the same
spirit. Here the objective is to provide a model for a single component system under
repeated stress. Fatigue damage is cumulative, so that repeated or cyclical stress
above a critical stress will eventually result in system failure. In the model the system
is subject to load cycles (or shocks) with random magnitude A(i) and intershock
times B(i), i = 1, 2, . . . The (A(i), B(i)) vectors are assumed independent. However,
the authors make the point that another interpretation can be found in insurance
mathematics. Here A(i) denotes the claim size of the ith claim, whereas the B(i)’s
denote interclaim times, see claim size process, claim number process. In this
case, they study the time until the first run of k consecutive critical (e.g. large)
claims and the maximum claim size during this time period.
The scope of the present article is quite different from the ones of these papers.
We will present reliability analysis in general having the following two main points
of view. Reliability analysis is a very helpful tool in risk assessment when de-
termining the insurance premiums for risks, especially of rare events, associated
with large systems consisting of both technological and human components. Fur-
thermore, reliability analysis is relevant in risk management of any technological
system, the aim now being to say something helpful on how to avoid accidents.
This is an area of growing importance representing an enormous challenge for an
insurance company.
It is a characteristic of systems that they consist of components being put to-
gether in a more or less complex way. Assume the system consists of n components
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and introduce the following random variables (i = 1, . . . , n)
Xi(t) =

1 if the ith component functions at t
0 otherwise,
and let X(t) = (X1(t), . . . , Xn(t)). The state of the system is now uniquely deter-
mined from X(t) by
φ(X(t)) =

1 if the system functions at t
0 otherwise
φ(·) is called the structure function. Note that it is assumed that both the com-
ponents and the system are satisfactorily described by binary random variables.
Barlow & Proschan [2] is the classical textbook in binary reliability theory. [6] is a
nice expository paper on reliability theory and its applications until 1985.
As an illustration consider a main power supply system of a nuclear power plant
given in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Main power supply system of a nuclear power plant
The system consists of two main branches in parallel providing power supply to
the nuclear power plant. The system is working if and only if there is at least one
connection between S and T. Component 1 represents offsite power from the grid
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whereas component 6 is an onsite emergency diesel generator. Components 2 and 3
are transformers while 4, 5 and 7 are cables (including switches, etc.). It is not too
hard to be convinced that the structure function of the system is given by
φ(X(t)) = 1− {1−X1(t)[X2(t) +X3(t)−X2(t)X3(t)]
× [X4(t) +X5(t)−X4(t)X5(t)]
}{1−X6(t)X7(t)} (1)
Now let (i = 1, . . . , n)
pi(t) = P (Xi(t) = 1) = EXi(t), (2)
which is called the reliability of the ith component at time t. The reliability of the
system at time t is similarly given by
hφ(t) = P (φ(X(t)) = 1) = E φ(X(t)) (3)
If especially X1(t), . . . , Xn(t) are stochastically independent, we get by introducing
p(t) = (p1(t), . . . , pn(t)) that hφ(t) = hφ(p(t)). For this case, for the power supply
system of Figure 1, we get from (3), (1), (2)
hφ = 1−
{
1− p1(t)[p2(t) + p3(t)− p2(t)p3(t)][p4(t) + p5(t)− p4(t)p5(t)]
}
× {1− p6(t)p7(t)} (4)
For large n, efficient approaches are needed such as the technique of recursive disjoint
products, see [1]. For network systems the factoring algorithm can be very efficient,
see [24].
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If X1(t), . . . , Xn(t) are stochastically dependent, hφ(t) will also depend on how
the components function simultaneously. In this case, if only information on p(t)
is available, one is just able to obtain upper and lower bounds for hφ(t), see [17].
The same is true, if n is very large, even in the case of independent components.
Dependencies between component states may for instance be due to a common
but dynamic environment, see the expository paper [25] where the effects of the
environment are described by a stochastic process.
In reliability analysis it is important not to think of systems just as pure techno-
logical ones. Considering the break-down of the Norwegian oilrig Alexander Kielland
in 1980, where 123 persons lost their lives, one should be convinced that the sys-
tems of interest consist of both technological and human components. The same
conclusion is more obvious when considering the accident at the Three Mile Island
nuclear power plant in 1979 and even more the Chernobyl catastrophy in 1986, see
[23]. Until now systems have often been designed such that the technological compo-
nents are highly reliable, whereas the human components operating and inspecting
these are rather unreliable. By making less sophisticated technological components
which can be operated and inspected by the human components with high relia-
bility, a substantial improvement of overall system reliability can be achieved. It
should, however, be admitted that analysing human components is very different
from analysing technological ones, see [28]. Similarly, software reliability is a branch
of reliability analysis having special challenges, see [26].
In risk management improving the safety of a system is essential. We then need
5
 measures of the relative importance of each component for system reliability, see [21].
Barlow & Proschan [3] suggested that the most important component is that having
the highest probability of finally causing system failure by its own failure. Natvig
[19] has developed a theory supporting another measure. Here the component whose
failure contributes most to reducing the expected remaining lifetime of the system
is the most important one. The latter measure obviously is constructed to improve
system life expectancy, whereas the first one is most relevant when considering
accidents scenarios. It should be noted that the costs of improving the components
are not entering into these measures.
The journal Nature, published an article [16] on an incident coming close to
a catastrophy, which occured in 1984 in a French pressurized water reactor at Le
Bugey, not far from Geneva. Here it is stated: “But the Le Bugey incident shows
that a whole new class of possible events had been ignored – those where electrical
systems fail gradually. It shows that risk analysis must not only take into account
a yes or no, working or not working, for each item in the reactor, but the possibility
of working with a slightly degraded system.” This motivates socalled multistate
reliability analysis where both the components and the system are described in a
more refined way than just as functioning or failing. For the power supply system
of Figure 1, the system state could for instance be the number of main branches
in parallel functioning. The first attempts of developing a theory in this area came
in 1978, see [4], [9]. Further work is reported in [18]. In [20] multistate reliability
analysis is applied to an electrical power generation system for two nearby oilrigs.
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The amounts of power that may possibly be supplied to the two oilrigs are considered
as system states. The type of failure at Le Bugey is also an example of “cascading
failures”, see the recent paper [12].
The Chernobyl catastrophy provided new data on nuclear power plants. What
type of theory do we have to benefit from such data in future risk analyses in the
nuclear industry? The characteristic feature of this type of theory is that one benefits
both from data for the system’s components and for the system itself. Furthermore,
due to lack of sufficient data one is completely dependent on benefiting from the
experience and judgement of engineers concerning the technological components and
on those of psychologists and sociologists for the human components. This leads to
subjectivistic probabilities and hence to Bayesian statistics. A series of papers
on the application of the Bayesian approach in reliability are given in [5]. In [7]
hierarchical Bayes procedures are proposed and applied to failure data for emergency
diesel generators in U.S. nuclear power plants. A more recent Bayesian paper with
applications to preventive system maintenance of interest in risk management is
[11].
A natural starting point for the Bayesian approach in system reliability is to
use expert opinion and experience as to the reliability of the components. This in-
formation is then updated by using data on the component level from experiments
and accidents. Based on information on the component level, the corresponding
uncertainty in system reliability is derived. This uncertainty is modifed by using
expert opinion and experience on the system level. Finally, this uncertainty is up-
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dated by using data on the system level from experiments and accidents. Mastran
& Singpurwalla [15] initiated research in this area in 1978, which was improved in
[22]. Recently, ideas on applying Bayesian hierarchical modelling, with accompa-
nying Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods, in this area have turned up, see
[13].
It should be noted that the use of expert opinions is actually implemented in
the regulatory work for the nuclear power plants in the USA, see [8]. A general
problem when using expert opinions is the selection of the experts. Asking experts
technical questions on the component level as in [10], where the consequences for the
overall reliability assessment on the system level are less clear, seems advantageous.
Too much experts’ influence directly on system level assessments could then be
prevented.
Finally, it should be admitted that the following obstacles may arise when car-
rying through a reliability analysis of a large technological system:
(i) lack of knowledge on the functioning of the system and its components
(ii) lack of relevant data
(iii) lack of knowledge on the reliability of the human components
(iv) lack of knowledge on the quality of computer software
(v) lack of knowledge of dependences between the components
These obstacles may make it very hard to assess the probability of failure in a risk
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assessment of a large technological system. However, still a risk management of
the system can be carried through by using reliability analysis to improve the safety
of the system.
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